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COURT OF APPEALS NO.
860099-CA

]1
]

(CATEGORY 13)

SUPREME COURT NO.
880443

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court granted Appellant's petition

for

writ of

certiorari by an order dated January 11, 1989.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant, North Ogden Professional Corporation, hereafter
referred to as "Corporation," appeals from the Court of Appeals'
order sustaining the District Court's judgment ordering Corporation's

dissolution.

The

Corporation

seeks

reversal

of the

judgment and enforcement of its alleged claim to redeem certain
shares of its stock held by Plaintiff, Edward Riche, hereafter
referred to as "Riche," for $1,000.

1

The Court of Appeals' statement of the facts is accurate
except for a brief clarification that follows hereafter:
On June 8, 1970, three medical doctors, Dr. Richard
Nilsson, Dr. Chauncey Michaelson, and Dr. David
Paul, formed defendant corporation under the Utah
Professional Corporation Act. Utah Code Ann. Sec.
16-11-1 to -15 (1987). The corporation's articles
of incorporation authorized the issuance of 50,000
shares of stock with a par value of $1,00 per
share.' The corporation issued 1,000 shares to Dr.
Nilsson, 1,000 to Dr. Michaelson, and 10 sharer to
Dr. Paul. The articles of incorporation restricted
the transfer of stock, permitting transfer only to
other members of the medical profession. On July 1,
1970, the shareholders and the corporation entered
into a stock redemption agreement, which also
restricted the transfer of stock and gave the
corporation a right of first refusal should any
shareholder desire to dispose of his stock and the
option to repurchase its stock at par value in the
event of the death of
a shareholder or upon a
shareholder's termination of employment by the
corporation.
Dr. Nilsson became involved in several unsuccessful
investments, culminating in his filing for bankruptcy in 1976. On November 20, 1981, the bankruptcy trustee applied to the bankruptcy court for
authorization to sell Dr. Nilsson's 1,000 shares of
stock in the cqrporation to Dr. Michaelson for
$1,000. This amount represented the par value of
the shares and the amount for which the corporation
would be entitled to redeem the shares, pursuant to
the stock redemption agreement, in the event it was
entitled to redeem.
Riche, a creditor of Dr.
Nilsson holding a judgment for $120,000, objected
and asked the bankruptcy court to require the
trustee to force a dissolution- of the corporation
so that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy estate could
receive his share of the total assets of the
corporation.
The bankruptcy court rejected both suggestions.
Instead, the court authorized a sale of the stock
to the highest bidder and, on August 12, 1982,
conducted a sale of the stock.
The bidding
proceeded in stages until Riche bid $2,600 and Dr.
Michaelson refused to make a higher bid. The court
authorized the sale of Dr. Nilsson's shares to
Riche for that amount. In doing so, the bankruptcy
2

court in no way .ruled on the validity of the
transfer or value of the stock and expressly made
the sale "subject to,f any applicable restrictions
in the stock redemption agreement and articles of
incorporation and all applicable provisions of
state law.
Upon sale of the stock to Riche, the corporation
tendered $1,000 to Riche, the par value of the
shares of stock purchased from the trustee, in
contemplation of the stock redemption agreement.
(This is the only part Riche takes exception to.
See below.)
Riche rejected the tender and made
demand upon the corporation for the issuance of the
1,000 shares of stock, redemption of his shares of
the corporation for their fair market value, a
corporate financial statement, and an opportunity
to inspect a copy of the corporate minutes, bylaws,
and articles of incorporation.
The corporation
refused to comply with Riche's demands and reiterated its perceived right to repurchase the
stock at par value.
Riche then filed an action in district court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 16-11-13 (1987) ,
which provided that, absent a redemption provision
to the contrary, a professional corporation has 90
days within which to purchase the shares of a
disqualified shareholder at their "reasonable fair
value."
Absent such purchase, an action may be
filed
to obtain
the "reasonable fair value" of
the shares or the corporation's dissolution. Id.
Following trial, the court found that once Riche
purchased all the rights, title, and interest that
Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy estate had in the 1,000
shares of stock, Riche was entitled, under both the
stock redemption agreement and Sec. 16-11-13, to
have his shares redeemed for their reasonable fair
value. The court found that dissolution was the
only viable
solution.
It ordered defendant
corporation to be immediately dissolved and to have
all its assets marshalled, its legal liabilities
paid, and the balance of its assets distributed to
the shareholders in the same ratio as their
respective
stock ownerships. The court also
entered
judgment against the corporation for
reasonable
attorney
fees as required by the
statute.
Edward A. Riche v. North Qgden Professional Corporation, Case No. 860099-CA, pp. 1, 2,
3.
3

The
Riche

only clarification of the above stared facts is that

asserts

the stock was purchased

on x\ugust

12, 1982

stated above and shortly thereafter made demand to redeem.

as
The

corporation made its first tender into the court of $1,000 as a
part of its answer to Riche's complaint filed September 23, 1983.
(R. pp. 10,11)
The Court of Appeals found in its findings that the state
law, the corporate articles, and the agreement taken as a whole
all restricted the voluntary transfer of the corporate stock to
unlicensed medical professionals. The Court of Appeals cited Utah
Code Annotated
corporation's

Section 16-11-7
articles

and

(1987), the restrictions of the

the

stock

repurchase

agreement

as

equivalent restrictions which prohibit voluntary transfers.
Although the voluntary restrictions exist in the agreement
the Court of Appeals found that the transfer as ordered by the
Bankruptcy Judge was an involuntary

transfer, not within the

restriction of state statute, corporate articles nor the repurchase agreement.

(Emphasis added)
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Riche asserts two issues:
1.

SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS' FINDING THAT THE PLAIN

MEANING OF THE STOCK REPURCHASE AGREEMENT "DOES NOT EVEN PURPORT
TO RESTRICT INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF STOCK, SUCH AS THE ONE IN
THE INSTANT CASE..." BE SUSTAINED RESULTING IN THE DISSOLUTION OF
THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
4

SECTION

16-11-13 (1987)?
2.
RESTRICTIONS

IN

THE

EVENT

THIS

COURT REVERSES

AND

OF THE REPURCHASE AGREEMENT APPLICABLE,

FINDS

THE

DID THE

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION BY ITS TENDER COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH THEN WOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE
CORPORATION'S REDEMPTION OF THE SHARES FOR $1,000?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Riche asserts two arguments why this Court should sustain
the lower courts:
(1)

Riche acquired the shares of the Corporation as a

result of a court-ordered

transfer.

The plain meaning of the

repurchase agreement restricts voluntary transfers, but not the
manner by which Riche received his shares.

At Riche's request,

the Corporation failed to redeem his shares for reasonable fair
value. Pursuant to Utah Code Section 16-11-13 (1987), dissolution
is the only other alternative.
(2)

Should

this

Court

find,

however,

the

repurchase

agreement applies, then Riche asserts that the Corporation failed
to

comply

with

the

terms

and

conditions

of

the

repurchase

agreement and did not make a timely tender.
ARGUMENT
Point 1:
SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS' FINDING
THAT THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STOCK REPURCHASE
AGREEMENT "DOES NOT EVEN PURPORT TO RESTRICT
INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF STOCK, SUCH AS THE ONE IN
THE INSTANT CASE..." BE SUSTAINED RESULTING IN THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION UNDER
5

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 16-11-13 (1987)?
Riche's declared position from the Bankruptcy Court to the
trial court has always been that the stock repurchase agreement
restricted voluntary transfer (T. p. 5 ) , however, the trial court
found for Riche for somewhat different reasons.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court's order of dissolution by simply
reviewing the stock repurchase agreement and applying what the
Court

of

Appeals

[Emphasis added]

calls

the

agreement's

"plain

meaning."

(Opinion attached, p. 7) In fact, the Court of

Appeals7 specific language is:
The agreement does not even purport to restrict
involuntary transfers of stock, such as the one in
the instant case which occurred pursuant to a court
ordered trustee's sale." (Opinion p. 7)
The Court of Appeals then cites Durkee v. Durkee-Mower,
Inc. , 428

NE

2d

139,

142

(Mass.

1981)

and

continues

in

its

opinion:
The restrictions . in the stock redemption agreement
only concern (1)
transfers upon the death of a
shareholder and (2) voluntary transfers during
life.
The

forenamed

Court

was

unwilling

to

"...

reach

the

question of whether, and to what extent, intended restrictions on
involuntary transfers might be enforceable." (Opinion p.7)
As if to stress its interpretation, the Court of Appeals
cited Durkee again, making it a vital part of the opinion:
[T]he scope of the restriction cannot be greater
than its actual language...
and with a resounding emphasis added:
Accordingly,

[w]e refuse to expand the clear and
6

unambiguous
language of the corporate stock
restriction and hold it applicable to a situation
not provided for when drafted. Id. p.7
Using
sustained

language cited, above the forenamed Court

the

trial

court's

judgment

for

reasons

readily
somewhat

different than relied upon by the trial court but cited BuehnerBlock Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95

(Utah i988) for

the principle

affirm

a trial

trial

court's

court's

that

decisions

an
on

proper

having assigned another
In view

appellate

of the

court

ground(s)

..."may
despite

reason for its ruling".
lower Court's

findings Riche asks this

Court to review the following relevant language:
RESTRICTION ON STOCK.
If any Shareholder at any
time desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise
dispose of any of his stock of the Company, or if
any Shareholder shall terminate his employment by
the Company, he shall offer all his stock to the
Company at par value by written notice addressed to
the principal office of the Company.
(Stock
Redemption Agreement, pp. 1, 2)
and determine if the plain meaning of the language may restrict
involuntary

transfers.

Corporation

is

offered

The
a

language

right

of

seems

first

clear

refusal

that

the

whenever

a

shareholder "desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise dispose of
his shares."

Id.

This language clearly exhibits a voluntary

disposition as opposed to a court-ordered sale in a bankruptcy
proceeding.
Especially is this concept brought more in focus considering

that

the

two

principal

shareholders,

Drs.

Nilsson

and

Michaelson, understood among themselves that each owned his own
accounts receivable.

(T. pp. 26, 27, 28, 92) Each testified at
7

trial that in their minds each doctor owned his receivable and
the only assets transferred for $1,000 would consist of bookkeeping equipment, desks, typewriters, etc.

(T. p. 92)

Even with Dr. Nilsson's understanding

that the accounts

receivable belonged to him, he did not place them on his bankruptcy schedule.

(T. p. 29)

Riche, from the beginning, as a creditor of the bankrupt's
estate, asked the trustee to dissolve the corporation so that all
creaitors might share pro-rata in the receivables. The Bankruptcy
Court

considered

Riche's

request,

chose,

however,

to

sell

whatever interest the trustee had to Riche as the highest bidder.
Riche seeks this Court's confirmation of the plain meaning
contained

in the agreement as found by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner, (Appellant's Brief, p. 13) cited Renberg v. Zarrow,
667 P. 2d 465 (Okla. 1983) as a case more in point.

An indepth

review of the case stands for the time-honored proposition that
given

the

informed

normal
parties

circumstances,
and

their

buy-sell

representatives

agreements
are

Riche takes no exception to this general principle.

between

enforceable.
The Renberq

case also extends the principle that two informed parties were
bound by their buy-sell agreement even though there was a large
disparity between the market price and the agreed upon buy-sell
price.

The large disparity in price was cited by the court as

insufficient cause to invalidate the buy-sell agreement. Id p.
470

Riche's case is distinguished by the Appellate Court's

finding of clear and unambiguous language that excludes involun8

tary

transfers

within

the

restrictions

of

the

agreement.

Therefore, Riche finding himself with unrestricted shares and an
unwilling Corporation to redeem them for reasonable fair value,
is entitled by law for an order from this court affirming the
lower court's order of dissolution pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 16-11-13 (1987).
Point 2:
IN THE EVENT
THIS COURT REVERSES AND
FINDS THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE REPURCHASE AGREEMENT
APPLICABLE,
DID THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION BY
ITS TENDER COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
THE AGREEMENT WHICH THEN WOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE
CORPORATION'S REDEMPTION OF THE SHARES FOR $1,000?
Assuming,
right

to

for

redeem

agreement.

The

Dr.

argument's
Nilsson's

agreement

sake, the
shares

itself

has

Corporation

for

$1,000

certain

had

the

under

the

preconditioned,

common notices, and options that the parties are bound to follow.
Given the undisputed facts Dr. Nilsson failed to offer his shares
to the corporation prior to his bankruptcy and the Corporation
took no action on its own behalf until the trustee in bankruptcy
made a second request dated June 24, 1982

(R. p. 55) for per-

mission to offer the shares for a higher bid.

Permission was

granted and solicitation for higher bids was made, and the stocks
sold to Riche.

This was completed on September 20, 1982.

Riche

made demand for redemption under a letter dated October 11, 1982
(R. p. 83).

The Corporation took no action and Riche, nearly a

year later, filed in a lower court for an order of dissolution
pursuant to Utah Code Section 16-11-13 (1987).
The Corporation filed its answer to Riche's complaint on
9

September 21, 1983, almost, a year after Riche had obtained his
rights to the shares.
petitioner

for

the

As a part of the Corporation's

first

time

tendered

its

District Court, claiming its redemptive rights.

answer,

$1,000

in

the

From the time

Dr. Nillsson filed bankruptcy in 1976 to the time the Corporation
filed its answer in September of 1983, the entire record, as it
relates to the Corporation, is void of any other clear effort
made by the Corporation to exercise its alleged rights to redeem.
There was talk of redemption but no actual tender.
The trial court, in its Finding number 16 stated:
Although the redemption agreement provides for
notices and procedural steps, no such steps or
procedures were followed or taken by defendant.
Number 2 4 of the lower Court's Finding continues:
There has been no redemption under the terms of the
stock redemption agreement, or under the provisions
of Code Section 16-11-13.
Therefore, under the
terms of the redemption agreement and Code Section
16-11-13 this Court concludes that all of the
evidence mandates that dissolution is the only
viable solution under Utah law. . . [Emphasis
added]
(R. 275-276) and (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law attached, pp. 2,7)
If the Corporation had a right to redeem, the evidence isoverwhelming that procedural, implementing steps or options and
terms of the agreement were ignored. Therefore, the Corporation
breached the agreement, forfeited its alleged rights of redemption, and Riche is entitled to an order affirming all the lower
court's rulings.
To rule otherwise would, in effect, allow Dr. Nilsson the
elimination

of

all his debts

through
10

his bankruptcy

and gain

control of his receivables (in excess of $200,000) (R. p. 23) and
gain

other minor assets of

judicially
into

a

sanctioned

buy-sell

substantially

the Corporation.

exemption, obtainable

agreement

shortly

reduced price.

prior

The effect: is a
simply by

to

entering

bankruptcy

at

a

Respondent does not suggest that

Dr. Nilsson from the beginning set up this elaborate procedure
to

gain

these

benefits.

Nevertheless,

benefits unless this Court

he

will

gain

affirms the lower Courts.

these

This is

because of the lower Court's Finding number 4 which states there
are

"considerable

assets" in the Corporation,

and

while

the

Corporation existed in the eyes of the general public, the two
doctors
owned,

ignored
after

receivables.

the

the

formal paperwork

payment

(Findings

of

of

and considered

expenses,

one-half

Fact No. 4, p. 2) The

that each

of

trial

other.

Court

found

that

each promoted

the

relationship

between the two principal doctors was extremely close.
the

all

In fact,

the welfare

of

the

Number 12 of the Court's Findings states in part:
12. All the evidence of this case taken as a whole
warrants a finding of fact that Dr. Nilsson and Dr.
Michaelson have jealously attempted to promote one
another's well being.
Further, there is no
evidence of a falling out or opposing positions
taken by Dr. Nilsson and/or Dr. Michaelson with
regard to one another and their respective welfare.
The evidence is actually to the opposite in the
extreme.
Insofar as Dr. Michaelson is concerned,
his efforts appear to be totally honest.
Given this relationship and the lower Court's findings it

is not difficult to assume Dr. Nilsson would be restored fully
for $1,000.

11

CONCLUSION
The basic facts are not in dispute.

Riche asks the Court

to read the redemption agreement and apply the plain meaning of
the words, given the Court of Appeals' ruling.
In the unhappy
courts,

and

event this Court differs with the lower

determines

the

agreement

applies

to

involuntary

transfers, this Court must then look at the terms and conditions
of the agreement and determine whether the Corporation complied.
Petitioner (Appellant's Brief, p. 19) states the Corporation made
a timely tender, and yet fails to produce any such credible evidence.

If an agreement exists Petitioner breached the terms and

conditions and should not now be allowed the rights under the
repurchase

agreement.

Conscience

dictates

under

the

lower

Court's Findings that Dr. Nilsson, in effect, ought not to be
allowed

the

benefits

of

his

bankruptcy

and

the

receivables

returned to his possession for $1,000.
Finally, in view of the filed briefs and arguments this
Court

may

want

to

reconsider

improvidently granted.

whether

or

not

certiorari

Israel Pagan Estate v. Capitol Thrift and

Loan, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (filed March 17, 1989).
DATED this

was

/^^dav of April, 1989.

^Z^^^y^^^<^1
P. 5 A M P S 0 N ^
!B50 Washington *Blvd., #102
Obden, UT 84401
Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f / R e s p o n d e n t

12

ADDiiu'DUM
STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-7 of the Utah Professional
Corporation Act provides:
A
professional
corporation
may
issue the shares of its capital stock
only to persons who are duly licensed to
render the same specific professional
services as those for which the corporation was organized. A shareholder may
voluntarily transfer his shares in a
professional
corporation
only
to a
person who is duly licensed to render
the same specific professional services
as those for which the corporation was
organized.
Any shares issued in violation of this section are void.
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13 of the Utah Professional
Corporation Act provides:
The articles of incorporation may
provide for the purchase or redemption
of the shares of any shareholder upon
the death or disqualification of such
shareholder, cr the same may be provided
in the by-laws or by private agreement.
In the absence of such a provision in
the
articles
of
incorporation, the
by-laws, or by private agreement, the
professional corporation shall purchase
the shares of a deceased shareholder or
a shareholder no longer .qualified to own
shares in such corporation within 90
days after the death of the shareholder
or disqualification of the shareholder,
as the case may be. The price for such
shares shall be their reasonable fair
value as of the date of death or disqualification of the shareholder.
If
the corporation shall fail to purchase
said shares by the end of said 90 days,
then the executor or administrator or
other
personal
representative
of a
deceased shareholder or any disqualified

shareholder may bring an action in the
district court of the county in which
the principal office or place of practice of the professional corporation is
located for the enforcement of this
provision. The court shall have power
to award the plaintiff the reasonable
fair value of his shares, or within its
jurisdiction, may order the liquidation
of the corporation.
Further, if the
plaintiff is successful in such action,
he shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneyfs fee and costs.
The
professional
corporation
shall
repurchase such shares without regard to
restrictions upon the repurchase of
shares provided by zhe Utah Business
Corporation Act.

\^i\iZ

^J
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Jil. .

Edward A. Riche,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Court of Appeals No. 360099-CA
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I hereby certify that on the 27th day of October, 1988, a true
:orrect copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally
ered to each of the above parties.
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ORME, Judge:

Defendant, North Ogden Professional Corporation, appeals
from a district court judgment ordering its dissolution. The
corporation seeks reversal of the judgment and enforcement of its
claimed right to redeem certain shares of its stock held by
plaintiff Edward Riche. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 8, 1970, three medical doctors, Dr. Richard Nilsson,
Dr. Chauncey Michaelson, and Dr. David Paul, formed defendant
corporation under the Utah Professional Corporation Act. Utah
Code Ann. § 16-11-1 to -15 (1987). The corporation's articles of
incorporation authorized the issuance of 50,000 shares of stock
with a par value of $1.00 per share. The corporation issued
1,000 shares to Dr. Nilsson, 1,000 to Dr. Michaelson, and 10
shares to Dr. Paul. The articles of incorporation restricted the
transfer of stock, permitting transfer only to other members of
the medical profession. On July 1, 1970, the shareholders and
the corporation entered into a stock redemption agreement, which
also restricted the transfer of stock and gave the corporation a
right of first refusal should any shareholder desire to dispose
of his stock and the option to repurchase its stock at par value

in the event of the death of a shareholder or upon a
shareholder's termination of employment by the corporation.
Dr. Nilsson became involved in several unsuccessful
investments, culminating in his filing for bankruptcy in 1976.
On November 20, 1981, the bankruptcy trustee applied to the
bankruptcy court for authorization to sell Dr. Nilsson's 1,000
shares of stock in the corporation to Dr. Michaelson fXDr $1,000.
This amount represented the par value of the shares and the
amount for which the corporation would be entitled to redeem the
shares, pursuant to the stock redemption agreement, in the event
it were entitled to redeem. Riche, a creditor of Dr. Nilsson
holding a judgment for $120,000.00, objected and asked the
bankruptcy court to require the trustee to force a dissolution of
the corporation so that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy estate could
receive his share of the total assets of the corporation.
The bankruptcy court rejected both suggestions. Instead,
the court authorized a sale of the stock to the highest bidder
and, on August 12, 1982, conducted a sale of the stock. The
bidding proceeded in stages until Riche bid $2,600 and Dr.
Michaelson refused to make a higher bid. The court authorized
the sale of Dr. Nilsson*s shares to Riche for that amount. In
doing so, the bankruptcy court in no way ruled on the validity of
the transfer or value of the stock and expressly made the sale
-subject toH any applicable restrictions in the stock redemption
agreement and articles of incorporation and all applicable
provisions of state law.
Upon sale of the stock to Riche, the corporation tendered
$1,000 to Riche, the par value of the shares of stock purchased'
from the trustee, in contemplation of the stock redemption
agreement. Riche rejected the tender and made demand upon the
corporation for the issuance of the 1,000 shares of stock,
redemption of his shares in the corporation for their fair market
value, a corporate financial statement, and an opportunity to
inspect a copy of the corporate minutes, bylaws, and articles of
incorporation. The corporation refused to comply with Riche's
demands and reiterated its perceived right to repurchase the
stock at par value.
Riche then filed an action in district court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 (1987), which provides that, absent a
redemption provision to the contrary, a professional corporation
has 90 days within which to purchase the shares of a disqualified
shareholder at their "reasonable fair value.- Absent such
purchase, an action may be filed to obtain the -reasonable fair
value" of the shares or the corporation's dissolution. Id.
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Following trial, the court found that once Riche purchased
all the rights, title, and interest that Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy
estate had in the 1,000 shares of stock, Riche was entitled,
under both the stock redemption agreement and § 16-11-13, to have
his shares redeemed for their reasonable fair value. The court
found that dissolution was the only viable solution. It ordered
defendant corporation to be immediately dissolved and to have all
its assets.marshalled, its legal liabilities paid, and the
balance of its assets distributed to the shareholders in the same
ratio as their respective stock ownerships. The court also
entered judgment against the corporation for reasonable attorney
fees as required by the statute. See id.
On «ppeal, the corporation argues that the court erred in
ordering its dissolution because it had a right to redeem its
stock pursuant to the stock redemption agreement and its articles
of incorporation. It claims that Riche, as someone who is not a
member of the medical profession, was entitled to $1,000, the par
value of the shares, and not the reasonable fair value of the
shares.
The corporation also argues that § 16-11-13 only applies in
the absence of a private agreement and that since the corporation
provided for the redemption of shares in its stock repurchase
agreement, the statute is inapplicable.1
STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT
The court found that Riche purchased the stock subject to
the provisions of the stock redemption agreement. The court
noted that the agreement protected the doctors from undesirable
associates, namely non-doctors, by prohibiting the sale or
transfer of stock to anyone who was not a member of the medical
profession. However, the court found the redemption agreement to
be ambiguous in at least two respects:2 (1) It did not define
1. Each party also asserts statute of limitations arguments
against the other. We agree with the trial court that these
contentions are without merit.
2. When a contract is ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to
find facts respecting the intention of the parties based on
extrinsic evidence, our review is limited, Kimball v. Campbell,
699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985), and we will not disturb the findings
and judgment so long as they are based on "substantial,
competent, admissible evidence." Car Doctor Inc. v. Belmont, 635
P.2d 82, 83-84 (Utah 1981). However, the threshold question of
whether or not a contract actually is ambiguous is a question of
law. Faulker v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).

the redemption price in that "par value** was not given a
numerical value in the agreement, and (2) its elaborate
provisions governing notices and procedures were "wholly
inconsistent with valuing Dr. Nilsson's interest at only
$1,000"; therefore, the parties must not have really meant Mpar
value" in the technical sense with respect to the redemption
arrangement contained in the agreement. We disagree.
As to thfi first point, the Utah Business Corporation Act
provides that the articles of incorporation shall set forth the
classes of shares and state their par value. Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10-49 (1987). The Professional Corporation Act provides
that "articles of incorporation shall meet the requirements of
the Utah Business Corporation Act." Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-4
(1987). Therefore, under the Professional Corporation Act read
in conjunction with the Utah Business Corporation Act,
defendant's articles of incorporation would be the appropriate
vehicle for defining the par value of the stock. The
definition of par value in the corporation's articles is, in
affect, incorporated into the stock redemption agreement.3
The stock redemption agreement was not ambiguous with respect
to the meaning of par value since "par value" is a term of art
and the document which should state par value did so
unambi guously.
As to the second point, we frankly do not find in the
agreement "extensive notices" or "procedural steps" which are
in any way inconsistent with "par value" meaning par value. It
is true the agreement gives the corporation the option of
paying the par value redemption over the course of a year,
which seems peculiar in the instant case where only $1,000
would arguably be payable. However, the articles authorized

3. [W]henever "two or more instruments are executed by the
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject
matter," courts should interpret them "together so far as
determining the respective rights and interests of the parties,
although they do not in terms refer to each other." Bullfrog
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271
(1972) .
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the issuance of 50,000 shares. A schedule of payments seems
unnecessary if the corporation need pay only $1,000 to redeem,
but it would be quite important if all the authorized stock
were issued and $25,000 or so had to be paid to redeem a
shareholder's stock. This possibility, not an aberrant notion
of "par value," appears to explain this provision. Nor has
Riche called to our attention any evidence that would support
the trial court's conclusion that the corporation really meant
something other than par value when it used that term in the
stock redemption agreement.
It does not follow, however, that the court's judgment
was in error. For reasons somewhat different than those relied
on by the trial court, its judgment is readily sustainable.4
STOCK RESTRICTIONS
Professional corporations are unique in some
respects.5 They are designed to allow "members of certain
professions the opportunity to practice together and enjoy the
tax and other advantages of the corporate form." Central State
Bank v. Albright, 12 Kan. 2d 175, 737 P.2d 65, 66-67 (Ct. App.
1987). See Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-3 (1987). " [Legislation
extending the power to incorporate to professionals seeks to
assure that corporate control will remain with persons"
licensed in the profession, and bound by the same professional
4. See, e,qtt Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892,
894-95 (Utah 1988).
5. This court recently confronted another aspect of their
uniqueness, which results from the Professional Corporation
Act's "purpose of making available to professional persons the
benefits of the corporate form for the business aspects of
their practices while preserving the established professional
aspects of the personal relationship between the professional
person and those he serves." Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-3 (1987).
See Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(shareholder in law firm organized as professional corporation
not vicariously liable for malpractice committed by another
shareholder unless personally involved in malpractice).
Although the Court's order or some notice thereof has not been
published, we are advised the Utah Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Stewart v. Coffman.

standards and ethics, by restricting the sale or transfer of
stock to members of the profession. Central State Bank v.
Albright, 737 P.2d at 67.
In this case, state law, the corporation's articles, and
the stock redemption agreement all prohibit the transfer of
shares in the corporation to persons not licensed in the
medical profession. Section 16-11-7 of the Utah Professional
Corporation Ace provides:
A professional corporation may issue the
shares of its capital stock only to
persons who are duly licensed to render
the same specific professional services as
those for which the corporation was
organized. A shareholder may voluntarily
transfer his shares in a professional
corporation only to a person who is duly
licensed to render the same specific
professional services as those for which
the corporation was organized. Any shares
issued in violation of this section are
void.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-7 (1987) (emphasis added).
Likewise, the corporation's articles of incorporation
provide:
The transfer and conveyance of this stock
shall be restricted in that such stock may
be issued, sold or transferred only to a
person or persons who are duly licensed to
render medical services; any other
transfer or issuance of shares shall be
void.
The corporation's stock repurchase agreement contains an
equivalent restriction.
Although the statute, the articles, and the agreement
prohibit the transfer of stock to anyone who is not a member of
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the medical profession, these prohibitions did not preclude the
transfer in this case. Restrictions on the sale of corporate
stock are held to apply only to "voluntary" transfers. See,
e.g. , Castonguav v. Castonguay, 306 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. 1981)
(stock restrictions did not apply to court-ordered assignment
pursuant to judgment of divorce). Indeed, this doctrine has
apparently been incorporated in § 16-11-7, quoted above, which
expressly refers only to voluntary transfers.
The same result is reached in this case by giving the
corporation's stock repurchase agreement its plain meaning. The
agreement does not even purport to restrict involuntary transfers
of stock, such as the one in the instant case which occurred
pursuant to a court-ordered trustee's sale. See Durkee v. Durkee
Mower, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Mass. 1981). The restrictions
in the stock redemption agreement only concern (1) transfers upon
the death of a shareholder and (2) voluntary transfers during
life. The agreement simply does not address involuntary
transfers during life.6 "[T]he scope of the restriction cannot
be greater than its actual language." Durkee v. Durkee-Mower,
Inc., 428 N.E.2d at 142. Accordingly, "[w]e refuse to expand the
clear and unambiguous language of the corporate stock restriction
and hold it applicable to a situation not provided for when
drafted." id.
Once a disqualified person,7 like Riche, acquires stock by
an involuntary transfer, the usual remedy is to compel
dissolution of the corporation pursuant to the applicable
statute. See generally Gulf Mortgage & Realty Investments v.
Alten, 282 Pa. Super. 230, 422 A.2d 1090, 1095-96 (1980).
STATUTORY SCHEME
A professional corporation may provide, through its articles
of incorporation, bylaws, or private agreement, for the
repurchase or redemption of shares upon the death or
disqualification of a shareholder. Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13
(1987). In the absence of such a provision, the repurchase or
redemption of shares must be accomplished pursuant to the
statutory scheme provided in § 16-11-13.
6. Accordingly, we need not reach the question of whether, and
to what extent, intended restrictions on involuntary transfers
might be enforceable.
7. "Qualification" and "disqualification" refer, in this sense,
to whether a shareholder is qualified to hold stock in the
professional corporation, i.e., whether he or she is duly
licensed as a member of the profession.
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In this case, the corporation's articles merely recited that
the statutory scheme would govern in the event of death or
disqualification of a shareholder. However, the corporation
subsequently entered into an agreement providing for the
redemption at par value of shares held by a shareholder at death
or upon a shareholder's termination of employment. The agreement
does not provide for redemption in the event of disqualification,
whether following the involuntary transfer to an unqualified
person or the subsequent disqualification of a formerly qualified
shareholder.8
Since the corporation did not provide in its articles, in
its bylaws, or by private agreement for the repurchase or
redemption of shares upon the disqualification of a shareholder,
the statutory procedure set forth in § 16-11-13 governs the
repurchase or redemption of shares in this case. That provision
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]he professional corporation shall
purchase the shares of a deceased
shareholder or a shareholder no longer
qualified to own shares in such
corporation within 90 days after the death
or disqualification of the shareholder, as
the case may be. The price for such
share[s] shall be their reasonable fair
value as of the date of death or
disqualification of the shareholder. If
the corporation shall fail to purchase
said shares by the end of said 90 days,
then . . . any disqualified shareholder
may bring an action in . . . district
court . . . for the enforcement of this
provision.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-13 (1987). The statute further authorizes
the court to order the liquidation of the corporation, id., which
was done in this case.

8. An unqualified transferee is treated the same as a
once-qualified shareholder who becomes disqualified. See also
Street v. Superman, 202 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967). See also
Note 7, supra.
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The judgment appealed from was properly entered and is
affirmed.

Gregory

K/TrrfeTJiKf??

WE CONCUR:

Richard--<r7~ _ Dayidson /

Re.iS}&3T~lf. G a r f f ,

J u d g e ^-7

Judge

/
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JOHN ?. SAMPSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, UT 34401
Te1ephone:
6 21-4015
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD A. RICHE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsNORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION, a Utah Professional corporation,

Civil No.

86158

Defendant.

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
on July 3, 1984, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting
without a jury, with John P. Sampson appearing as attorney for
plaintiff and Herschel J. Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck,
Jr. appearing as attorneys for defendant.

This was an action

brought by plaintiff to obtain an accounting and order of dissolution of defendant corporation pursuant to Utah Code Section
16-11-13. The Court having heard and examined the evidence,
both oral and documentary, introduced by the parties hereto,
having heard the arguments of counsel, and having taken the
matter under advisement for the purpose of consideration, now
finds and decides as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant's articles of incorporation, retirement

plan, Leases and the stock redemption agreement were prepared
by Attorney Paul Hansen.

They were executed on or ibcut the

dates generated.
2.

The defendant is a legal, bona fide professional

corporation under the laws of the State of Utah and is and was
recognized as such in the community for the purpose of providing
medical services in exchange for fees charged and collected.
3.

Said corporation was created and structured primarily

for tax purposes.
4.

The defendant corporation has considerable assets

in the form of leases, furniture and fixtures, office equipment,
medical paraphernalia and all accounts receivable generated
by the services of past and present corporate employees and/or
the professional corporations of Dr. Michaelson and Dr. Nilsson.
Notwithstanding the validity to the general public of the defendant corporation, the two doctors as between themselves, did
not regard the formal paperwork of the corporation as a change
in their relationship.

Among themselves, each doctor understood

he would claim from the corporation his receivables and onehalf of Dr. Paul's generated receivables after all normal operating
costs were paid.
5.

The Articles of Incorporation provide that 50,000

shares might be issued.

The corporate records show that as

of the date of Dr. Nilsson's bankruptcy the following shares were

outstanding: Dr. Nilsson, 1,000 shares, Dr. Paul, 10 shares,
and Dr. :iichaeison, 1,000 shares.
6.

This Court finds that there were no formal shareholder

meetings and/or director meetings.
7.

Since incorporation, the entire receivables generated

by the services of Drs. Michaelson, Nilsson and Paul and/or
their related professional corporations, are the properties
of the defendant.

Said doctors have been paid a fixed wage

or draw, but that said wage or draw was calculated to be less
than ^heir respective billings, so that there would be sufficient
funds for other corporate purposes such as retirement plans
and appropriate bonuses.
8.

Dr. Michaelson and Dr. Nilsson owned in North Ogden

certain real property held in a partnership.

This improved

real property was the facility in which the corporation conducted
its business.

The lease was adjusted from time to time in order

to affect the most desirable tax results for the two doctors.
Dr. Paul did not enjoy the benefits of ownership in the real
property.
9.

Initially the defendant corporation provided a retire-

ment plan for Dr. Nilsson and subsequently retirement plans
were arranged for both doctors through their individual professional
corporations. All business transactions between the various
entities and doctors were always considered in connection with
their respective tax consequences and the creditor problems
of Dr. Nilsson.

Examples of such planning and close association

between the two principal doctors are as follows:
ship practice prior to incorporation; (2)
defendant corporation; (3)
partnership; (4)
(5)

(1) A partner-

The formulation of the

the formation of the real estate

the formation of individual retirement plans;

the formation of individual professional corporations,

and (6) assistance and protection Dr. Michaelson gave Dr. Nilsson
by purchasing delinquent trust deed notes on Dr. Nilsson's home
and other real estate interests.

Dr. Nilsson's individual examples

consisted of the following:

His sale to his retirement

(1)

fund of his coin collection, which cost him $130,000 for $30,000.
This resulted in a tax loss in 1974 and substantial economic
benefits to his retirement fund and further avoidance of his
creditors.

(2)

Just prior to have had placed substantial judgments

against Dr. Nilsson, he granted substantial trust deeds on his
home and other real estate holdings to favored parties.

(3)

Dr. Nilsson1s bankruptcy schedules listed individual assets
at inordinately low values.
10.

Years prior to bankruptcy, 1973, Dr. Nilsson

reported substantial income and net worth in excess of $1,400,000.
At the conclusion of the bankruptcy, the Trustee reported to
the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he had only been
able to obtain less than $4,000 in assets.

Two Thousand Six

Hundred Dollars of that amount came from the plaintiff because
of the purchase of the North Ogden Professional Corporation stock.
11.

Ken Jensen's records and exhibits are accepted

by the Court with regard to the collectability, and receivable

amounts Teneratea ov the respective employees throughout rhe
relevant ^erioa of une corporation's existence.
12.

All the evidence of this case taken as a wnoie

varrants a findma of fact that Dr. Nilsson and Dr. Michaelson
iave jealously attempted to promote one another's well being.
Further, tnat t n e ^ is no evidence of a falling out or opposing
positions uaKen by Dr. Nilsson and/or Dr. Michaelson with regard
zo one another and their respective welfare.
actually to tne opposite m

the extreme.

The evidence is

Insofar as Dr. Micnael-

son is concerned, nis efforts apoear to be totally honest.
13.

The Stock Redemption Agreement provided tnat

Dr. Nilsson and Dr Michaelson would be protected from undesiraPle
associates under the terms and conditions as provided oy the
Agreement.
14.

The Court finds, nowever, ""hat the Stock Redemotion

Agreement is ambiguous in at least two respects:

(1)

The Agree-

ment does not define the purchase price of the disposing partner's
interest in that par value is not delineated with a numerical
value.

(2)

The extensive notices, procedural steps, payment

schedule and options available among the parties to the Stock
Redemption Agreement are wholly inconsistent with valuing Dr.
Nilsson's interest at only $1,000.
15.

All of the evidence, including but not limited

to the jealous attempts on the part of the doctors to promote
one another's welfare, their various interrelated business leases
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and igreements, retirement plans, and the mutual understanding
between the doctors relating to individual receivables leaves
this Court to conclude and find that a disposing shareholder
was to be deait with equitably under the terms of the Stock
Redemption Agreement.

Therefore, this Court finds that par

value, as defined for purposes of the Redemption Agreement,
meant market value.
16.

Although the Redemption Agreement provides for

notices and procedural steps, no such steps or procedures were
followed or taken by defendant.
17.

Dr. Richard E. Nilsson filed bankruptcy on July 8,

18.

July 8, 1976, is the effective date that all

1976.

of Dr. Nilsson's interest in the 1,000 shares, including the
rights, privileges and values of the North Ogden Professional
Corporation stock became subject to the jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee subsequently appointed.
19.

On August 12, 1982, this Court finds, Edward

Riche legally purchased all right, title and interest Dr. Nilssonfs
bankrupt estate had in the 1,000 shares of the North Ogden Professional Corporation.
20.

Therefore, after the purchase on August 12, 1982,

Edward Riche was entitled under the Redemption Agreement and/or
Code Section 16-11-13, to have his shares redeemed for reasonable
fair market value.

21.

Prior to the Bankruptcy Court's sale of the 1,000

shares uo plaintiff, Edward Riche, no determination or value
reaarding the restriction or encumbrances relating to the Stock
Redemption Agreement was made.

As a result of the purchase

by plaintiff, Edward Riche, the Bankruptcy Court assigned all
its right, title and interest to plaintiff and left this Court
the right and responsibility to determine the value, encumbrances
and/or restrictions, if any, with regard to the Stock Redemption
.Agreement.
22.

Within appropriate time limits provided under

the Stock Redemption Agreement and/or Code Section 16-11-13,
Attorney John P. Sampson, on behalf of plaintiff, Edward Riche,
made demand for the redemption of his shares for then-reasonable
market -Talue.
23.

No reasonable market value was tendered by defend-

ant under the Stock Redemption Agreement nor under the terms
and conditions of Code Section 16-11-13.

Reasonable market

value means 49.75% of all assets including, but not limited
to, furniture and fixtures, office equipment, supplies, medical
paraphernalia and accounts receivable less the costs of operating
the clinic at any given time.
24.

There has been no redemption under the terms

}f the Stock Redemption Agreement, or under the provisions of
:ode Sec. 16-11-13.

Therefore, under the terms of the Redemption
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Agreement and Code Section 16-11-13 this Court concludes that
all the evidence mandates that dissolution is the only viable
solution under Utah law.

Under the terms of the Stock Redemption

Agreement and the Utah Professional Corporation Act, the plaintiff
may not continually maintain ownership of the 1,000 shares of
North Ogden ProfeoS^onal Corporation stock.
25.

This Court concludes that the statute of limitations

does not bar either party regarding their relative assertions.
This Court concludes that the Trustee, during the bankruptcy
period, had each party's contentions and assertions in litigation
and, therefore, the statutory period of limitations was suspended
during the bankruptcy period until the time of the sale and
a reasonable period thereafter.
26.

The plaintiff, under the terms of Code Section

16-11-13, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees to be determined
by the parties by means of affidavit and/or a subsequent special
hearing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The enactment of the Utah Professional Corporation

Act was not intended to create any form of exemption beyond
the exemption statutes of the State of Utah.

Thus, a professional

stock interest is subject to all normal bankruptcy statutes
and creditor rights.
2.

This Court concludes that the Stock Redemption

Agreement as a matter of law was ambiguous for the reasons stated

above m d that par value as defined in the Stock Redemption
Agreement meant reasonable market value.

Furthermore, Code

Section 16-11-13 also applies and required a redemption of plaintiff's 1,000 shares at reasonable market value.
3. 'Plaintiff, Edward Riche, as a result of the purchase,
owns all right, title and interest in the 1,000 shares of North
Ogden Professional Corporation stock; that plaintifffs demand
for redemption at a reasonable fair value was made timely under
the :erns of the Stock Redemption Agreement and/or including
Code Section 16-11-13.
4.

That the appropriate steps for redemption were

HOC taken by defendant according to the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement nor under provisions of Code Section 16-11-13.
5.

Since no redemption was made,the plaintiff is

entitled to an Order from this Court to have defendant immediately
dissolved, to have all the assets marshalled, accounted for,
legal liabilities paid and the balance of the assets distributed
to the shareholders in the same ratio as their respective stock
ownerships reflect, which are as follows:

Dr. Michaelson, 1,000

shares, Dr. Paul 10 shares, plaintiff Edward Riche,1,000 shares.
6.

Let judgment be entered against defendant for

reasonable attorney's fees and court costs as determined and
provided for in the Findings of Fact.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

' ^,

day of September,-

1984, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Lav;, postage prepaid, to Herschel J.
Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr., WATKISS & CAiMPBELL, 310 South
Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, and to Pete

N. Vlahos, VLAKOS, PERKINS & SHARP, 24 47 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah
84401.
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JOHN ?. SAMPSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, UT 844 01
Telephone: 621-4015
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD A.

^^X,

RICHE,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 8615S

NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION, a Utah Professional corporation,

*\

r-v

Defendant,

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
on July 3, 1984, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting
without a jury, with John P. Sampson appearing as attorney for
the plaintiff and Herschel J. Saperstein and Joseph T. Dunbeck,
Jr. appearing as attorneys for the defendant.
Trial was then conducted upon the issues raised in
plaintifffs complaint and defendant's answer.
Wherefore, the Court having heard the evidence, and
finding the evidence sufficient to warrant judgment in favor
of plaintiff, and having made and entered its findings of fact
and conclusions of law, now gives judgment:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff,
Edward A. Riche, is the sole owner of all rights, title and interest
in the 1,000 shares of North Ogden Professional Corporation
stock.
IT 13 FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
plaintiff's demand for redemption at a reasonable fair value
was made timely under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement
and/or the provisions of Code Section 16-11-13.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: the
defendant did not take the appropriate steps for redemption under
the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, nor did the defendant
comply with the reasonable terms of Code Section 16-11-13.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant
corporation be ordered immediately dissolved in that plaintiff,
along with an appropriate representative of the remaining shareholder
are hereby ordered to marshall all assets, provide for all legal
liabilities, and the balance of said assets to be distributed
to shareholders in the same ratio as their respective stock
ownerships were reflected at trial:

Dr. Michaelson, 1,000 shares, D]

Paul, 10 shares, and plaintiff, Edward A. Riche, 1,000 shares.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff is awarded judgment for court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees as determined by affidavit and agreement among the parties1
counsel.
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NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT made this first day of July, 1970, by and
between Richard E. Nilsson, M.D., Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D.,
and David W. Paul, M.D. , hereinafter called the "Stockholders"
and the North Ogden Professional Corporation hereinafter called
the "Company".

WHEREAS, the Stockholders own stock in the Company
as follows:

STOCKHOLDER

COMMON STOCK

Richard E. Nilsson, M.D.

1,000 shares

Chauncey D. Michaelson, M.D,

1,000 shares
10 shares

David W. Paul, M.D.

and desire to express their agreement regarding their rights and
obligations as Stockholders of the Company; and,

WHEREAS, the Stockholders and the Company desiie to provide
an arrangement whereby In the event of the death of any one of the
Stockholders, the survivors of them shall own the Company,

IT IS THEREFORE AGREED:
1.

Restriction on SLock.

If any Stockholder at any time

2 DEFENDANT'S
CYUMIT

desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise dispose of any of his stock
of the Company, or if any Stockholder shall terminate his employment
by the Company, he shall offer all his stock to the Company at par
value by written notice addressed to the principal office of the
Company.
A Stockholder shall be deemed to have terminated his employment at the end of four (4) months continuous absence from the business
without approval and shall be deemed to have made written offer of his
stock to the Company at the expiration of such period, excluding
absences with the permission and consent of the Company.

Within thirty

(30) days after receipt of such offer, tne Company may deliver written
notice of acceptance of such offer to the offering Stockholder at his
residence, fixing a closing date for the purchase of the stock not
more than thirty (30) days thereafter, or, alternatively the Company
may within such period deliver written notice to the offering Stockholder
that it is being dissolved and liquidated.

If the Company elects either

of these courses, the offering Stockholder shall vote and take any other
necessary action in accordance with the vote of the remaining Stockholders
(or, if there is more than one remaining Stockholder, the Stockholder or
Stockholders owning a majority of the remaining voting stock), so as to
effectuate the will of the Company.

It is expressly stipulated, however,

that the Company shall have the right not to pursue either of these
courses, in which event the offering Stockholder may dispose of his
stock to any other physician approved by the Company who is employed by
the Company, free of the restrictions of this agreement: or, alternatively,
he may call a meeting of the Stockholders and Directors, within sixty (60)

days after the Company!s receipt of the original offer, at which he
may vote all the shares of the Company held by him and by the other
Stockholders in favor of immediate dissolution, the offering Stockholder being deemed to hold a proxy for this purpose.

2.

Death of Stockholder,

After the death of any one of

the Stockholders while owning stock in the Company, the Company shall
be dissolved unless it shall elect to purchase at par value all the
stock of the Compan}' owned by the decedent at the time of his death,
giving written notice of its election to the executors or administrators of the decedent* hereinafter called the persona] representatives,
and to the decedent's surviving widow, within sixty (60) days after
appointment of such personal representatives.

In the event the Company

elects to purchase the stock of the decedent, it shall fix a closing
date not more than thirty (30) days after its giving of the foregoing
notice, and the personal representatives of the decedent and the decedent's widow shall be obliged to sell their stock on the terms hereinafter provided.

The personal representatives of the deceased Stockholder

and his surviving widow shall vote and take any other necessary action
in accordance with the vote of the remaining Stockholder (or if there
is more than one remaining stockholder, the Stockholder or Stockholders
owning a majority of the remaining voting stock), so as to effectuate the
will of the Company.

3.

Free Transferability of Stock.

A Stockholder may transfer

all or any portion of his stock to any person qualified by the Articles
of Incorporation to be a stockholder; provided, however, that the Stock-

holder desiring to transfer ail or any portion of his shares first
shall advise the Company of the proposed transfer.

Prior to any such

sale, the Company shall have the option to redeem the said stock at
the par value.

If said option is not exercised by the Company within

fifteen (15) days after notice to it of the proposed sale, the Stockholder shall be free to sell said stock to said transferee.

4,

Purchase Price.

For the purpose of Paragraph 1 and 2

above, the purchase price of all the stock of the Company shall be par
value.

5*

Payment of Purchase Price.

Payment of the purchase price

to be paid by the Company for the stock of a Stockholder in thp circumstances provided for in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be made as follows:
(a)

In case of a purchase under Paragraph 1, at the options

of the Company either in a lump sum on the closing or one-third (1/3)
shall be paid at the closing fixed by the Company, the balance in two (2)
equal non-interest bearing installments payable six (6) months and
twelve (12) months respectively, after the closing; payment must be made
in cash.
(b)

In case of a purchase under Paragraph 2, the entire amount

shall be paid at the closing fixed by the Company in a lump sum or in not
to exceed five (5) equal non-interest bearing installments, the first payable at the closing and succeeding installments payable six (6), twelve (12),
eighteen (18), and twenty-four (24) months after such closing.
If the surplus of the Company is insufficient for the Company to

purchase its stock, the Company and its officers and stockholders shall
promptly take all necessary steps to reduce the capital stock of che
Company to the extent required.

6/

Obligations Pending Payment, Pending full payment of the

purchase price as provided for in Paragraph 4 above:
(a) The sellers or their personal representatives shall deposit
their stock at the closing with an escrow agent of his, or their, choice,
deliverable against final payment.
(b) The Company's policies and operations shall be governed by
the following:

(1)

the nature of the Company's business will not be

altered, and such business will be conducted and property will be sold, and
commitments made, only in the ordinary course:
distributions will be declared or paid;

(3)

(2) no dividend or other
the level of compensation

paid employees or officers shall not be increased unless warranted by
increased business.

7.

Endorsement on Stock Certificates. During the continuance of

this agreement, all stock certificates of .the Company shall bear an endorsement as follows:
"This certificate is held subject to the terms of an
agreement, dated the
day of
19 , a copy of which
is on file at the principal office of the Company in Ogden,
Utah.

8.

Arbitration.

Any controversy arising under this agreement

shall be settled in Ogden, Utah, by arbitration under the rules then
existing of the American Arbitration Association; provided, however, that

arbitration will not be exclusive remedy: and if the parties must retain
attorneys to resolve such controversy, the party determined to be at
fault or in breach shall pay all reasonable attorney's fees of the other
party.

9*

Benefit.

This agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit

of the parties, their personal representatives, successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this instrument
the day and year first above written.
STOCKHOLDERS

Richara E, Nilsson ^

-

f§N:t%a! U/JfJ/lfA/A
"CoauhcTey D. Micliaelson V

David W. Paul

COMPANY
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

Chauncey D./Michaelsony President
ATTEST:

P

S

.

MxlJMM-

Richard E. NiJsson, M.D
Secretary

^ ^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Comes

now

counsel

certifies to the Court

for

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

and

that ten (10) copies of the Respondent's

Brief were hand-carried to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, 332 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT
34114, and that
Vlahos

and

F.

four

(4) copies were hand-carried

Kim Walpole, attorneys

to Pete N.

for Defendant\Appellant,

2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, UT 844rOl this *2_J <
day of April, 1989,

rOHN P. SAMB80N
attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

13

